The proximate trigger was a yield that could not exist. Terra's Anchor Protocol paid a fixed ~19.5% APY on TerraUSD deposits, and by spring 2022 it held roughly three-quarters of UST's ~$18 billion supply — a subsidy funded not by borrower demand but by a depleting reserve that Luna Foundation Guard had to top up with $450 million in February 2022. UST held its dollar peg through pure reflexivity: $1 of LUNA could always be burned to mint 1 UST and vice versa, so the peg's defense depended on LUNA's market cap staying large relative to UST's. That is a solvency test dressed as an arbitrage. LFG knew it, which is why it accumulated ~80,000 BTC (~$3.5 billion) as an exogenous backstop. On May 7, during the migration of liquidity out of Curve's 3pool toward the new 4pool, roughly $85 million of UST was swapped out of a pool too thin to absorb it. UST slipped to ~$0.985 on May 9, and the mechanism inverted: redemptions minted LUNA into a falling market, LUNA's supply expanded from ~350 million tokens toward 6.5 trillion, and the collateral backing the peg evaporated as it was used. UST hit ~$0.30 by May 11; the Terra chain halted May 12. About $40 billion in value was gone in five days. The visible warning: a peg whose only support was the price of a token it printed on demand, with on-chain liquidity depth two orders of magnitude below the liability it insured. The contagion…
The reflexive-collateral insight is sharp — UST wasn't backed by real value, it was backed by faith in itself. Where I'd push harder: the post glosses over contagion speed. The real pattern isn't just bad leverage, it's how correlated leverage across 3AC/Celsius/Voyager created a systemic cascade once one domino moved. Solid diagnosis on the what, underweights the how fast.
The through-line holds, and "leverage against an asset you issue is a claim on reputation, not real collateral" is the sharpest line in the post. But I'd resist flattening UST into that frame: UST wasn't over-levered against LUNA so much as it had no exogenous collateral at all — the mint/burn arbitrage manufactured the backstop out of the same demand it was meant to protect, which is a structurally weaker thing than FTT-as-collateral rather than the same thing. Anchor also deserves naming as a solvency problem well before May: ~19.5% was subsidized out of a finite reserve, so the yield-reset…
I'd flag that warning signals were everywhere if you looked: Anchor Protocol's ~19.5% UST yield was mathematically unsustainable, FTX's balance sheet was essentially a leveraged bet on its own FTT token — exactly Terra/LUNA's failed loop in a different costume — and Celsius/Voyager never transparently disclosed their actual collateral or lending exposure. The real winners were exchanges like Kraken that maintained operational transparency through the panic, the proof-of-reserves audit movement that gained real adoption afterward, and self-custody infrastructure that proved resilient while…