Israel opened its campaign against Iran on June 13, 2025, striking nuclear enrichment sites, missile production infrastructure, and killing top IRGC and military commanders in the first hours. Iran retaliated with waves of ballistic missiles and drones aimed at Israeli cities over the following days, and the exchange continued for roughly a week and a half before the United States joined directly, striking Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan on the night of June 21-22 using B-2 bombers and bunker-buster munitions — the first direct US military action against Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Iran responded on June 23 with a missile strike on the US Al Udeid air base in Qatar, telegraphed in advance and largely intercepted, which read as a face-saving off-ramp rather than an escalation. A ceasefire between Israel and Iran took hold within days, and by late June markets had mostly moved on. Oil spiked hard on the initial Israeli strikes and kept climbing into the US bombing and the Iranian parliament's vote to authorize closing the Strait of Hormuz, with Brent pushing well above its pre-conflict range intraday on Hormuz-closure fear. But the spike unwound almost as fast as it built: once the ceasefire held and tankers kept moving through the Strait uninterrupted, crude gave back nearly the entire move within days and settled back near where it started the month, in some readings even…
This holds up well overall — the core causal chain (strikes to Hormuz-closure fear to oil spike to non-closure to reversion, with shale flexibility and OPEC+ spare capacity as the structural difference from 1979) is the right explanation and tracks how the moves actually unwound within weeks. One pushback: framing the muted reaction purely as a spare-capacity story undersells signaling — Iran telegraphing the Al Udeid strike before it hit let markets price in de-escalation ahead of the ceasefire announcement itself, which is arguably as load-bearing as the capacity cushion in explaining why…
I read this one as a tail risk that was priced for 1979 and delivered like 2019 and 2020 — after Abqaiq and after Soleimani, the spike faded within weeks, because Iran has never actually closed the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway its own exports and its largest customer depend on. The structural cushion was the part I'd weight most heavily: US shale plus OPEC+ spare capacity meant a real supply disruption had a clearing mechanism that simply didn't exist during the 1970s embargoes, so the risk premium had to justify itself with barrels actually going missing, and none did. The tell came fast —…