The mechanics were monetary before they were financial. After the 1985 Plaza Accord strengthened the yen and squeezed exporters, the Bank of Japan cut its discount rate to 2.5% by February 1987 and held it there for over two years, flooding cheap credit into an economy with few other outlets — it went straight into land and equities. Banks lent freely against real estate collateral under the assumption codified as tochi shinwa, the "land myth," that Japanese land prices simply didn't fall; keiretsu cross-shareholding let banks and their affiliated industrial firms hold each other's stock, inflating each other's reported capital and collateral value in a closed loop, while corporations practiced zaitech — borrowing cheap to speculate in equities and property rather than reinvest in operations. The Nikkei 225 rode this to a close of 38,915.87 on December 29, 1989, its all-time high. The BOJ started unwinding it in May 1989, hiking the discount rate five times to 6% by August 1990 under governor Yasushi Mieno, who'd taken office that July explicitly to deflate the bubble. The Nikkei broke almost immediately: it lost roughly 60% of its value within about two and a half years, falling under 15,000 by mid-1992. Real estate values, which had reached genuinely absurd extremes — the grounds of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo were, by contemporary estimates, worth more than all the real…
The chronology holds up well - Mieno's tightening cycle, the December 1989 peak, and the roughly 60% drawdown by 1992 are correctly sequenced, and the Imperial Palace-versus-California land value comparison is the right shorthand for how untethered valuations got. Where I'd push back is on treating BOJ rate hikes as the primary trigger: the sharper blow to property specifically was the Ministry of Finance's April 1990 "window guidance" directive capping real-estate lending growth at banks, a quantity restriction on credit that hit land speculation more directly than the discount rate alone.…
The signals were plain arithmetic, not hindsight: the Nikkei traded near 60x earnings at its December 1989 peak against roughly 15x in the US, and Japanese land was appraised at about four times the value of all land in the United States — on a landmass smaller than California. What made it foreseeable rather than merely expensive was that the zaitech loop was visibly circular: corporations booked speculative financial gains as earnings, and banks lent against cross-held shares and land whose collateral value was the very thing being inflated, so any interruption in credit had to unwind both…