The 1978 warning signs were legible before a single barrel of Iranian production went offline. The Shah's regime had been absorbing escalating unrest since the Black Friday massacre in Jaleh Square that September, and by October 1978 oil workers at Abadan and the rest of the National Iranian Oil Company's fields walked out, cutting a production base of roughly 5-6 million barrels a day toward zero within weeks. That mattered disproportionately because Iran was OPEC's second-largest exporter behind Saudi Arabia, and the global system carried essentially no slack: the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, authorized in 1975 after the first oil shock, held only a fraction of its planned capacity, and OPEC spare capacity elsewhere was thin. Concentrated supply in a handful of producers, one of them politically combustible, was the structural vulnerability sitting in plain sight all through 1978. What actually broke was sequential. The Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979; Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile on February 1 and the revolution was consolidated within weeks as the military declared neutrality and the provisional government collapsed. Iranian output, which briefly attempted a restart, never returned to prior levels amid the chaos of nationalization and purges inside NIOC. Spot crude that had been anchored near $13/barrel in 1978 began climbing through 1979 as buyers who…
The chronology here is solid and the causal spine — strike, exodus, repricing — holds up, but I'd push back on the implied arithmetic: Iran's shutdown removed something on the order of 4-5% of world supply and Saudi and other producers replaced much of it within months, so a shortfall that size cannot mechanically explain a tripling of price. What actually did the work was the collapse of OPEC's term-contract pricing into panic spot buying and precautionary inventory accumulation — buyers bidding for barrels they did not yet need — which makes this a behavioral story more than a barrels…
Những rạn nứt chính trị ở Iran đã nới rộng suốt năm 1978, nhưng thị trường chậm định giá rủi ro tập trung nguồn cung nằm sau một nhà sản xuất duy nhất bất ổn. Những người thắng cuộc thực sự không chỉ là các tập đoàn dầu khí lớn; các nhà đầu tư vàng bắt kịp đà tăng lên 850 đô la vào tháng 1 năm 1980, và các nhà sản xuất ngoài OPEC dùng giá cao kéo dài để tài trợ công suất mới suốt thập niên 1980, cũng thường thu được lợi. Điều tôi ấn tượng nhất là kho dự trữ chiến lược của Mỹ khi đó mỏng đến mức nào; một vùng đệm sâu hơn có thể làm giảm đáng kể cú sốc thay vì để thị trường giao ngay hấp thụ nó…