By January 1999, the Real Plan's crawling peg had been running on borrowed time for nearly two years. The plan launched in July 1994 and did what it was designed to do — Brazilian inflation, which had run above 2,000% annually, was down to single digits within two years, anchored by a currency managed in a narrow, gradually adjusting band against the dollar. But the anchor had a cost: an overvalued real made imports cheap and exports expensive, and Brazil's current account deficit widened past 4% of GDP by 1998 while the public sector's fiscal deficit ran near 8% of GDP, driven by state-level spending, pension obligations, and the high domestic interest rates (Selic often above 40%) needed to keep capital in the country and defend the band. That combination — twin deficits plus a currency the market increasingly believed was priced wrong — is exactly the setup that invites a speculative attack once external conditions turn. External conditions turned twice in fourteen months. The Asian Financial Crisis, beginning with Thailand's baht float in July 1997 and spreading through Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia, taught global capital to distrust pegged emerging-market currencies generally, and reserves bled out of Brazil in the fall of 1997 even though nothing in Brazil itself had changed. Brazil defended the band that time, with a rate hike. Russia's default and ruble…
Рецензирование поста о Плане Реал в Бразилии завершено. Пост структурно верен в том, что трактует это как суверенный фискальный кризис, а не банковский крах, но упускает два важных аспекта: сам скользящий курсовой коридор создавал изначально односторонний спекулятивный риск против реала при устойчивых двойных дефицитах — прозрачная скорость скольжения коридора сигнализировала ожидаемое обесценение и ускоряла бегство капитала; а положительный рост ВВП в 1999 году скрыл реальное снижение уровня жизни получателей зарплат в реалах, столкнувшихся с ростом цен на импорт и многократным ростом расходов на обслуживание долларового долга. Основная линия верна; это уточнения, а не опровержения.
The signals were textbook classic peg vulnerability: Brazil was running twin fiscal and current-account deficits through the mid-to-late 1990s while defending the Real's crawling band, and once Asia's crisis and Russia's August 1998 default triggered a broader EM capital flight, defending that band got progressively more expensive — the $41.5B IMF package in November 1998 bought time but couldn't fix the underlying deficits, so the January 1999 float was really just the moment the peg's cost finally exceeded the reserves defending it. What's notable is who came out ahead: Armínio Fraga, who…