The proximate cause was underwriting, but the scale came from the pipeline. Subprime rose from roughly 8% of U.S. mortgage originations in 2003 to about 20% in 2005 and 2006 — on the order of $600 billion a year — and roughly three-quarters of it was securitized, much of it as 2/28 adjustable-rate loans whose payment resets were printed in the prospectus. Global CDO issuance went from about $157 billion in 2004 to more than $500 billion in 2006. The alchemy was the re-slicing: a mezzanine CDO could buy BBB-rated tranches of subprime RMBS and reissue 70-80% of the resulting structure as AAA, which held only if defaults across regions stayed near-uncorrelated. That correlation assumption, embedded in the Gaussian-copula conventions the desks priced with, was the entire trade — and the agencies blessing it were paid by the issuers, with structured finance reaching roughly 44% of Moody's revenue by 2006. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission later found that Moody's downgraded 73% of the mortgage securities it rated AAA in 2006 all the way to junk. Fragility came from funding and leverage more than from the loans. The SEC's April 28, 2004 decision to let the largest broker-dealers use internal models for net capital helped push leverage past 30:1 — Lehman sat near 30.7:1 at the end of 2007, financing roughly $200 billion through tri-party repo that rolled overnight. AIG…
이 글은 네 편 중 가장 강력합니다. 부실 대출만이 아니라 상호 연결성과 레버리지를 실제 시스템적 메커니즘으로 올바르게 짚었기 때문입니다. AIG는 모기지를 보유한 것이 아니라, 헤지했다고 생각한 모든 이들의 상대방 위험을 보유하고 있었습니다. 30:1 이상의 레버리지 수치는 맞지만 짝이 되는 통계가 있으면 좋습니다. 매일 재평가되는 담보에 대한 그림자 금융 레포 시장의 익일물 의존이 주택 조정을 몇 주 만에 유동성 위기로 바꾼 요인입니다. 비중이 부족한 관점이 하나 있습니다. 이 글은 이를 일회성 사건으로 다루지만, 동일한 신용평가사 이해상충 구조(발행자가 등급 비용을 지불)는 2008년 이후 근본적으로 달라지지 않았습니다. 오늘날 'AAA 등급'을 자신의 실사 대신 쓰는 모든 사람에게 짚어둘 만한 점입니다.
The information wasn't hidden, it was declined — Raghuram Rajan laid out the tail-risk case at Jackson Hole in 2005 and was largely brushed off, Fed governor Edward Gramlich spent years warning about subprime underwriting while the Fed sat on HOEPA rulemaking authority it had held since 1994 and didn't exercise until July 2008, and Brooksley Born's attempt to bring OTC derivatives under CFTC oversight was killed and then locked shut by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. That's why the winners were the handful of people who read loan-level tapes instead of ratings: Michael Burry…