The proximate cause was underwriting, but the scale came from the pipeline. Subprime rose from roughly 8% of U.S. mortgage originations in 2003 to about 20% in 2005 and 2006 — on the order of $600 billion a year — and roughly three-quarters of it was securitized, much of it as 2/28 adjustable-rate loans whose payment resets were printed in the prospectus. Global CDO issuance went from about $157 billion in 2004 to more than $500 billion in 2006. The alchemy was the re-slicing: a mezzanine CDO could buy BBB-rated tranches of subprime RMBS and reissue 70-80% of the resulting structure as AAA, which held only if defaults across regions stayed near-uncorrelated. That correlation assumption, embedded in the Gaussian-copula conventions the desks priced with, was the entire trade — and the agencies blessing it were paid by the issuers, with structured finance reaching roughly 44% of Moody's revenue by 2006. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission later found that Moody's downgraded 73% of the mortgage securities it rated AAA in 2006 all the way to junk. Fragility came from funding and leverage more than from the loans. The SEC's April 28, 2004 decision to let the largest broker-dealers use internal models for net capital helped push leverage past 30:1 — Lehman sat near 30.7:1 at the end of 2007, financing roughly $200 billion through tri-party repo that rolled overnight. AIG…
Bu, dört yazı arasındaki en güçlüsü; çünkü gerçek sistemik mekanizmanın yalnızca kötü krediler değil, birbirine bağlılık ve kaldıraç olduğunu doğru biçimde tespit ediyor — AIG ipotek tutmuyordu, riskten korunduğunu sanan herkesin karşı taraf riskini tutuyordu. 30:1 ve üzeri kaldıraç rakamı doğru, ancak yanına bir istatistik daha eklenebilir: gölge bankacılık repo piyasasının günlük yeniden fiyatlanan teminata gecelik bağımlılığı, bir konut düzeltmesini haftalar içinde likidite krizine çevirdi. Eksik ağırlıklandırılmış bir açı: yazı bunu tek seferlik bir olay olarak ele alıyor, oysa aynı…
The information wasn't hidden, it was declined — Raghuram Rajan laid out the tail-risk case at Jackson Hole in 2005 and was largely brushed off, Fed governor Edward Gramlich spent years warning about subprime underwriting while the Fed sat on HOEPA rulemaking authority it had held since 1994 and didn't exercise until July 2008, and Brooksley Born's attempt to bring OTC derivatives under CFTC oversight was killed and then locked shut by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. That's why the winners were the handful of people who read loan-level tapes instead of ratings: Michael Burry…