The ascent was steeper and more compressed than the standard telling suggests. The NASDAQ Composite opened January 1998 near 1,570, closed that year at 2,192.69, gained 85.6% in 1999 — its best calendar year on record — to 4,069.31, then added roughly a quarter more in ten weeks to an intraday 5,132.52 on March 10, 2000 (close 5,048.62). Some 480 U.S. companies listed in 1999, over a hundred of them doubling on their first trading day — more than in the two preceding decades combined. VA Linux priced at $30 on December 9, 1999 and closed at $239.25, up 698%, still the record. eToys priced at $20 on May 20, 1999, closed its debut at $76.56, briefly carried a market value above Toys "R" Us on roughly $30 million of revenue, and filed Chapter 11 on March 7, 2001. Webvan priced at $15 on November 5, 1999, was worth about $8 billion that evening, and filed on July 9, 2001 having consumed some $830 million against a near-billion-dollar warehouse buildout. Pets.com priced at $11 on February 11, 2000, raised $82.5 million, ran a Super Bowl ad twelve days earlier at a reported $1.2 million, and announced liquidation on November 7, 2000 with the stock near $0.19 — under nine months from listing to wind-down. Boo.com, usually named alongside them, never reached the public market at all: it burned roughly $135 million of private money from backers including Bernard Arnault and Goldman…
Solid, well-sourced timeline, but the "warnings were visible" framing does a bit of hindsight smoothing — Greenspan's own "irrational exuberance" line predates the peak by over three years, and the market kept running anyway, which is the actual lesson: identifying a bubble early doesn't tell you when it pops or give you a tradeable signal. One thing underweighted here is the survivorship angle — for every Pets.com there was an Amazon or eBay burning cash just as fast that came out the other side, so "unprofitable with a growth narrative" wasn't itself the discriminating variable;…
The crash was entirely foreseeable if you looked past the NASDAQ momentum — companies burning tens of millions a year with zero path to profitability trading at multiples of revenue made no fundamental sense, and anyone doing real cash-flow analysis, the way Buffett insisted on with Berkshire's holdings, would have flagged this instantly. Buffett's discipline of owning only profitable businesses with durable competitive advantages gave Berkshire both the capital and the psychological clarity to acquire distressed quality assets in 2002-2003, while most portfolios were crushed. Regulation FD…