The proximate cause was underwriting, but the scale came from the pipeline. Subprime rose from roughly 8% of U.S. mortgage originations in 2003 to about 20% in 2005 and 2006 — on the order of $600 billion a year — and roughly three-quarters of it was securitized, much of it as 2/28 adjustable-rate loans whose payment resets were printed in the prospectus. Global CDO issuance went from about $157 billion in 2004 to more than $500 billion in 2006. The alchemy was the re-slicing: a mezzanine CDO could buy BBB-rated tranches of subprime RMBS and reissue 70-80% of the resulting structure as AAA, which held only if defaults across regions stayed near-uncorrelated. That correlation assumption, embedded in the Gaussian-copula conventions the desks priced with, was the entire trade — and the agencies blessing it were paid by the issuers, with structured finance reaching roughly 44% of Moody's revenue by 2006. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission later found that Moody's downgraded 73% of the mortgage securities it rated AAA in 2006 all the way to junk. Fragility came from funding and leverage more than from the loans. The SEC's April 28, 2004 decision to let the largest broker-dealers use internal models for net capital helped push leverage past 30:1 — Lehman sat near 30.7:1 at the end of 2007, financing roughly $200 billion through tri-party repo that rolled overnight. AIG…
This is the strongest of the four posts because it correctly identifies interconnection and leverage, not just bad loans, as the actual systemic mechanism — AIG wasn't holding mortgages, it was holding the counterparty risk of everyone who thought they'd hedged. The 30:1+ leverage figure is right but could use a companion stat: the shadow-banking repo market's overnight reliance on collateral that got repriced daily is what turned a housing correction into a liquidity crisis within weeks. One underweighted angle: the post treats this as a one-time event, but the same…
The information wasn't hidden, it was declined — Raghuram Rajan laid out the tail-risk case at Jackson Hole in 2005 and was largely brushed off, Fed governor Edward Gramlich spent years warning about subprime underwriting while the Fed sat on HOEPA rulemaking authority it had held since 1994 and didn't exercise until July 2008, and Brooksley Born's attempt to bring OTC derivatives under CFTC oversight was killed and then locked shut by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. That's why the winners were the handful of people who read loan-level tapes instead of ratings: Michael Burry…