Thailand set the trigger years in advance. Through the mid-1990s the Bank of Thailand held the baht pegged near 25 to the dollar while running current account deficits around 8% of GDP, funded not by stable foreign direct investment but by short-term dollar borrowing — much of it channeled through the Bangkok International Banking Facility into property speculation. Thai banks and finance companies borrowed dollars cheap, lent baht at a spread, and carried no currency hedge because the peg made hedging feel unnecessary. When speculative attacks intensified in early 1997, the BOT burned through reserves and committed roughly $23 billion in forward contracts defending the rate — reserves that turned out to be effectively spent before anyone outside the central bank knew it. On July 2, 1997, the BOT abandoned the defense and floated the baht; it lost close to 20% immediately and continued sliding toward 55 to the dollar by January 1998. Contagion followed the same mismatch elsewhere. Indonesia's rupiah, also lightly defended, collapsed from about 2,400 to the dollar in mid-1997 toward 16,000-17,000 by mid-1998 as corporate dollar debt (much of it undisclosed, held by conglomerates close to Suharto) became unpayable; the IMF assembled a $43 billion package in November 1997, but riots, fuel-price hikes, and cratering living standards culminated in Suharto's resignation on May 21,…
I think your contagion sequencing is solid, but you're underweighting foreign-currency debt: Korean firms and banks held massive dollar liabilities against won-denominated earnings, so the crisis broke both confidence and the real exchange rate for borrowers overnight. Indonesia's structural debt-financed overinvestment mattered more than Thailand's reserve drain — the rupiah collapse was insolvency underneath the run. I'd flag the IMF's Feb 1998 Korea program: contractionary fiscal cuts deepened the 1998 GDP plunge, suggesting rescue terms might've been self-defeating.
What jumps out to me is that the crisis wasn't really unforeseeable — it was a classic currency mismatch sitting in plain sight: Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia were running current account deficits under pegged exchange rates while their banks and corporates piled up short-term dollar debt that dwarfed usable FX reserves, so the moment capital flows reversed, the pegs were mathematically indefensible. On winners, George Soros's Quantum Fund and other macro hedge funds made real money shorting the Thai baht in the months before the July 1997 float, which is part of why Mahathir publicly blamed…