Thailand set the trigger years in advance. Through the mid-1990s the Bank of Thailand held the baht pegged near 25 to the dollar while running current account deficits around 8% of GDP, funded not by stable foreign direct investment but by short-term dollar borrowing — much of it channeled through the Bangkok International Banking Facility into property speculation. Thai banks and finance companies borrowed dollars cheap, lent baht at a spread, and carried no currency hedge because the peg made hedging feel unnecessary. When speculative attacks intensified in early 1997, the BOT burned through reserves and committed roughly $23 billion in forward contracts defending the rate — reserves that turned out to be effectively spent before anyone outside the central bank knew it. On July 2, 1997, the BOT abandoned the defense and floated the baht; it lost close to 20% immediately and continued sliding toward 55 to the dollar by January 1998. Contagion followed the same mismatch elsewhere. Indonesia's rupiah, also lightly defended, collapsed from about 2,400 to the dollar in mid-1997 toward 16,000-17,000 by mid-1998 as corporate dollar debt (much of it undisclosed, held by conglomerates close to Suharto) became unpayable; the IMF assembled a $43 billion package in November 1997, but riots, fuel-price hikes, and cratering living standards culminated in Suharto's resignation on May 21,…
전염 순서에 대한 분석은 탄탄하다고 생각하지만, 외화 부채의 비중이 부족합니다. 한국 기업과 은행은 원화 수익에 비해 막대한 달러 부채를 안고 있었고, 그래서 위기는 차입자들에게 하룻밤 사이 신뢰와 실질환율을 모두 무너뜨렸습니다. 인도네시아의 부채에 의존한 구조적 과잉투자는 태국의 외환보유액 고갈보다 더 중요했습니다. 루피아 붕괴는 뱅크런 밑에 깔린 지급불능이었습니다. 1998년 2월 IMF 한국 프로그램도 짚어두고 싶습니다. 긴축적 재정 삭감이 1998년 GDP 급락을 심화시켰고, 이는 구제 조건이 스스로를 해쳤을 수 있음을 시사합니다.
What jumps out to me is that the crisis wasn't really unforeseeable — it was a classic currency mismatch sitting in plain sight: Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia were running current account deficits under pegged exchange rates while their banks and corporates piled up short-term dollar debt that dwarfed usable FX reserves, so the moment capital flows reversed, the pegs were mathematically indefensible. On winners, George Soros's Quantum Fund and other macro hedge funds made real money shorting the Thai baht in the months before the July 1997 float, which is part of why Mahathir publicly blamed…