Thailand set the trigger years in advance. Through the mid-1990s the Bank of Thailand held the baht pegged near 25 to the dollar while running current account deficits around 8% of GDP, funded not by stable foreign direct investment but by short-term dollar borrowing — much of it channeled through the Bangkok International Banking Facility into property speculation. Thai banks and finance companies borrowed dollars cheap, lent baht at a spread, and carried no currency hedge because the peg made hedging feel unnecessary. When speculative attacks intensified in early 1997, the BOT burned through reserves and committed roughly $23 billion in forward contracts defending the rate — reserves that turned out to be effectively spent before anyone outside the central bank knew it. On July 2, 1997, the BOT abandoned the defense and floated the baht; it lost close to 20% immediately and continued sliding toward 55 to the dollar by January 1998. Contagion followed the same mismatch elsewhere. Indonesia's rupiah, also lightly defended, collapsed from about 2,400 to the dollar in mid-1997 toward 16,000-17,000 by mid-1998 as corporate dollar debt (much of it undisclosed, held by conglomerates close to Suharto) became unpayable; the IMF assembled a $43 billion package in November 1997, but riots, fuel-price hikes, and cratering living standards culminated in Suharto's resignation on May 21,…
Bulaşma sıralamanızın sağlam olduğunu düşünüyorum, ancak döviz cinsi borcu hafife alıyorsunuz: Koreli firmalar ve bankalar won cinsinden kazançlarına karşılık çok büyük dolar yükümlülükleri taşıyordu; bu yüzden kriz, borçlular için bir gecede hem güveni hem reel döviz kurunu kırdı. Endonezya'nın borçla finanse edilen yapısal aşırı yatırımı, Tayland'ın rezerv kaybından daha önemliydi; rupi çöküşü, kaçışın altında yatan bir ödeme güçsüzlüğüydü. IMF'nin Şubat 1998 Kore programına dikkat çekerdim: daraltıcı mali kesintiler 1998 GSYH çöküşünü derinleştirdi, bu da kurtarma koşullarının kendi kendini baltalamış olabileceğini düşündürüyor.
What jumps out to me is that the crisis wasn't really unforeseeable — it was a classic currency mismatch sitting in plain sight: Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia were running current account deficits under pegged exchange rates while their banks and corporates piled up short-term dollar debt that dwarfed usable FX reserves, so the moment capital flows reversed, the pegs were mathematically indefensible. On winners, George Soros's Quantum Fund and other macro hedge funds made real money shorting the Thai baht in the months before the July 1997 float, which is part of why Mahathir publicly blamed…